The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:

Right-Wing Positions Are Obstacles to Peace

            In 1947 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a plan to partition what was then the British Mandate of Palestine. Additionally, a deadline for British control of the mandate was set for May 14, 1948. [1] The moment Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion declared Israeli independence on the same day, the regional Arab neighbors of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, and Iraq moved to suck the life out of a newborn Israel through an invasion. The 1948 Israel War of Independence immediately followed Ben-Gurion’s declaration.[2] Since that moment, multiple wars have been fought and the sheer existence of Israel has been in danger, the degree to which has varied over the past 65 years. The height of that danger came in 1973 when Israel was on the defensive after facing a surprise attack by several Arab armies. The Arab offensive was ultimately beaten back and Israel’s security was, at least for the moment, preserved.[3]

            Following the 1973 war it seemed as though the larger Arab-Israeli conflict would continue on without much change as it had for nearly 30 years, until Egypt and Israel came to a landmark peace agreement in 1978.[4] Egypt had invaded Israel on several occasions. Under the leadership of Menachem Begin, Israel was able to make peace with an enemy it had fought against for decades. In the process, Israel displayed the willingness to negotiate with an Arab partner and offer concessions to the other as well. A result of the peace agreement was the return of the economic and military jewel of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.[5]

            Just over 20 years later, Israel would again prove its willingness to forge peace with her Arab neighbors. Jordan, like Egypt, had invaded Israel on more than one occasion. Nonetheless, Israel took advantage of the opportunity to make peace with another one of its former enemies, and in 1994 signed a peace deal with the Kingdom of Jordan.[6] While Begin was Israel’s prime minister in 1978 and leader of the right-wing Likud government when Israel signed a peace deal with Egypt, Israel’s prime minister in 1994 was left-wing Labor party leader Yitzhak Rabin.[7] Even with Israel’s commitment to peace with Jordan, the late 1980’s made sure Israel’s main focus of the 1990’s, and eventually the 2000’s, was the Palestinian problem.

            For several reasons, efforts to make peace with the Palestinians were, and will be, largely doomed from the beginning. The chief barrier for this inability to broker peace has been the popularity of right-wing groups on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. Consequently, right wing ideologies pose the most serious threat to a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace deal. This paper will take a look at the right-wing positions of each side and why they, along with the existence of Islamic extremism in particular, will prevent an Israeli-Palestinian solution regardless of policy outcomes in Israel. First, this paper will provide a background on Israeli-Palestinian relations, beginning with the 1982 Lebanon war through the second Palestinian intifada, before analyzing why Islamic extremism poses a preeminent threat to a prospective Israeli-Palestinian peace.

 

II. Two Turbulent Decades

            The 1977 Israeli elections changed the face and outlook of the country. Left-wing politics controlled Israel since Ben-Gurion and the Mapai party took office with Israel’s independence. Likely a result of the 1973 war, the right-wing Likud party shook Israeli politics with their victory in 1977 and Begin became prime minister. His coalition government “was totally dedicated to the realization of Palestine in its entirety,” including the West Bank, an idead that can be described as “Greater Israel.”[8] Security became an integral focus and concern of the Likud coalition, and Egypt was the first to form peace with Israel, as previously mentioned.[9] After securing peace with Egypt, the Israeli government turned their attention to the growing problem presented by the Palestinians.

            Under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) moved to Lebanon in 1971 after Jordan violently banished the organization.[10] The PLO was the preeminent Palestinian organization from its inception in 1964 through the 1990’s. Cross-border attacks from Southern Lebanon into Israel helped precipitate Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982.[11] With Israel’s southern and eastern borders more or less secure, “the only prospect of a challenge to Israeli power came from the existence of the PLO and its state-within-a-state in southern Lebanon.”[12] If the PLO could be ousted from southern Lebanon, there would be nowhere for them to go that bordered Israel, thereby dampening their impact on the minds of the Palestinians living in the occupied territories. Or so the Israelis thought.

            The goal of the invasion was to crush PLO strongholds in the southern portion of Lebanon. In the process, Israel would control a security buffer up to twenty-five miles north of the border. The idea was that Israel would “create conditions that would improve the prospects for consolidating Israel’s indefinite control of the West Bank” by handily defeating the PLO in Lebanon.[13] Israel sought to eradicate, or at least severely diminish the power of, the PLO as a Palestinian authority by dealing them “a heavy blow from which it would not recover for years.”[14] The result was the PLO was expunged from Lebanon and reorganized in Tunis, Tunisia. Israel did indeed deliver a blow to the PLO, but one of the hardest blows came internally.

            The invasion itself was a significant departure from previous Israeli foreign policy. Before 1982’s Lebanon invasion, Israel maintained a staunch defensive posture. Israel’s pivot to an offensive policy proved to be damaging on several levels. Internationally, Israel was seen as a pariah and an oppressor. [15] Regionally, the invasion sowed the seeds for the formation of Hezbollah in Lebanon while leaving Israel no closer to formulating a peace with the Palestinians.[16] Internally, high troop losses and a declining international image hurt Israeli morale and ultimately led to Begin’s resignation from the premiership.[17] This did not result in a drastic change in policy, however, as Yitzhak Shamir became prime minister. Shamir fell even further to the right on the political spectrum than Begin, going as far as to oppose Begin’s work for the Camp David accords with Egypt.[18]

            Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the Lebanon invasion from the Israeli-perspective was the effect it had on the Palestinians. First, the Palestinians “demonstrated a greater capacity for fighting that the Israelis had anticipated,” which in turn led to “raised morale and pride among Palestinians everywhere.”[19] Taking into account the result of the invasion, it is easy to rationalize why the Palestinians felt this way. They had, for all intents and purposes, repelled a superior force while inflicting significant casualties in the process. By and large, the Palestinians came out of the Lebanon experience with “an increased determination to resist Israeli rule.”[20] This determination would lead to the outbreak of the first Palestinian intifada in December of 1987.

            Increased determination was not the only reason the Palestinians rebelled through Intifada, or “shaking off.”[21] The two most significant reasons played into the hands of Islamic extremist groups, namely Hamas. The first reason is that “by the mid-1980’s, an entire generation of Palestinian youth had grown up under Israeli occupation,” living “with curtailed civil rights and in political limbo.”[22] Additionally, these Palestinians were “disillusioned with the PLO” as they had been unable to “succeed either militarily or politically in securing Palestinian self-determination.”[23] Hamas was able to capitalize on this disillusionment. The second factor was the Israeli policy that aggressively increased Jewish settlement construction in the West Bank. The uprising consisted of boycotts toward Israeli goods and businesses, stone-throwing at Israel Defense Force (IDF) troops, as well as terrorist violence.[24] Intifada ultimately led to the organization of Hamas, an organization constituting a legitimate threat to the existence of Israel, let alone the possibility of an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Why Hamas poses such a threat will be looked at in the next section.

            The Israeli government was operating under a faulty “National Unity” since 1984. Elections in 1984, and later 1988, illustrated the divided nature of the Israeli populous. Likud and Alignment, the predecessor to the Labor party, were both unable to form a coalition government with smaller parties.[25] Finally, Rabin was able to form a Labor majority government following the 1992 Israeli elections. [26] Peace talks proceeded between Israel and the PLO in Oslo, Norway.[27] As the 1990’s wore on, it became clear that Oslo was built on sand. There were several issues with the Oslo accords, but each side’s long-time insistence on calling Jerusalem their capital precluded the possibility of an everlasting peace. Oslo fell apart, and peace talks between Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David in 2000 ultimately failed as well.[28] Palestinian backlash involved terrorist activities such as suicide bombings under influence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and the Second Intifada ensued.

 

III. Right-wing Positions Getting Nowhere

            There were opportunities to reach an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement from the First Intifada moving forward. In essentially all cases, right-wing politics on both sides prevented the formulation of a lasting peace. The Oslo process not only failed to provide a peace agreement, but laid the groundwork for increasingly violent Palestinian disapproval of Israeli occupation. The Second Intifada, bloodier than the first, followed. Before delving into the role Islamic extremism has played in the inability to find peace, the role of the Israeli right-wing will be analyzed first.

            Once Likud came to power in 1977 they embarked on policy ideologically in line with “Greater Israel.” The notion behind the theory of “Greater Israel” is that Israel’s borders should be restored to their biblical positions.[29] This would include the territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, land that can possibly be offered to the Palestinians as a part of a potential peace agreement. In order to fulfill the “Greater Israel” ideology, the Begin government built new Jewish settlements in the territories on strategic sites and in densely populated Arab areas accompanied by the encouragement of Israeli movement into the territories.[30] Likud maintained their insistence on building new settlements while refusing “any concessions that could imply eventual Israeli withdrawal from the [territories].” [31] This positioning prevented any meaningful dialogue from taking place on the Palestinian problem. When Likud did talk -– to Egypt during their peace talks – “no progress could be made on the establishment of Palestinian self-rule and negotiations deadlocked.” [32] Likud made it clear that territorial compromise was not a possible negotiating option. If they did indeed want a solution to the Palestinian issue, they would have to budge on the immovable issue of territorial compromise.

            The national unity governments of the 1980’s led to a decline in Likud support. However, it was not enough to where Likud was unable to continue their settlement policy. As Perlmutter stated, “Another Likud victory, not to be altogether excluded as a possibility, would turn back the clock and deepen the division of the nation.” He added some rather straightforward wisdom, being that “there can be no unilateral withdrawal under the auspices of a Likud government.”[33] One effect of the new settlements being built throughout the 1980’s was such that any sort of withdrawal or territorial compromise was off the table. This, in turn, “undermine[d] every attempt of Labor to initiate negotiations on the future of the [territories]” while under the unity government.[34] Contrast Likud’s position with that of the Labor party. After Rabin became prime minister for the second time, Israeli policy toward the Palestinians shifted dramatically. Observing the failure of Likud’s “iron fist” response to the Intifada, Rabin “began to accept that the Intifada could not be resolved by military means and that it required a political solution that addressed the root of the matter: the occupation.”[35] Labor’s decision to move forward and out of a biblical shadow presented an opportunity for peace. Likud’s position offered no such opportunity.

            That opportunity came in the form of the Oslo peace talks in 1993. It resulted in both sides recognizing the other, but pushed talks about the reality of a self-governed Palestinian nation to a later date. The topic of Jerusalem posed the greatest roadblock to peace, even more so than the territories. Both sides are unwilling to even blink on the topic of Jerusalem. Both claim the ancient city as their capital.[36] Yet, Oslo proved that the possibility of peace still exists. In order to bring Arafat to the table “Rabin was ready to make far-reaching concessions” including, for the first time, a “willing[ness] to withdraw Israeli forces from the occupied territories.”[37] Again, contrast this with the rhetoric and policy of the Likud governments.

            A transfer of territorial jurisdiction and functional authority over areas of the territories to the Palestinians also was a move forward for Israel.[38] This drastic departure in policy illustrates the ability for Israel to move forward with peace. Even if the government is run by the right-wing, like it was following the 1996 elections, there is the substantial possibility that a leftist government willing to make peace is not far in the offs and that a peace process may continue. This is the benefit of democracy. The possibility of a peace, however, is close to lost as long as Islamic extremist groups are functioning in the area. Israel’s election of Likud’s Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996 reflected a fear of terrorism in the Israeli populous. Terrorist attacks in 1996 by Hamas was probably enough to sway the tide in Netanyahu’s favor, as polls throughout the year favored Shimon Peres to win the premiership.[39] The influence of Hamas, and Islamic extremism in general, on the prospects of peace was growing during the 1990’s.

            Raphael Israeli, author of The Oslo Idea: The Euphoria of Failure, made a point that “it is noteworthy…that Muslim radicals have not monopolized Islamic thinking and sloganeering.”[40] He continues by comparing the use of Islamic rhetoric in Palestinian nationalism to that of other forms of Arab nationalism: “Mainstream Palestinian nationalism…has made use of Islamic symbols and vocabulary to characterize enemies [and] to imply modes of action against them.” It seems as though Israeli contradicted himself. The fact that the Palestinian identity is so closely linked to the Muslim faith is evidence of the influence of Islamic discourse in Palestinian society. To take it a step further, the notion of Islamic “extremism” is almost repetitive. Popular concepts such as jihad, or “war against nonbelievers,” are common elements in Islamic thought.[41] In a land so deeply controlled by religious beliefs and teachings, such discourse is not seen as “extreme,” but as a part of the religion.[42] and poses a grave danger to the an Israeli-Palestinian peace. While there are extremists who identify with other religions, the nature of Islamic teachings, namely the Quran’s solution to dealing with infidels (which is death), lends itself to a greater prevalence of right-wing “extremist” movements within Islam.

            Peace was derailed due to the combination of “Islamic radicalism and the intifada [that] created a powerful Palestinian-Arab movement that currently represents Palestinian nationalism on the ground.”[43] Islamic extremism cannot coexist with a Jewish state if its very practitioners believe that Israel should be destroyed. Even though Oslo helped the Palestinians reach “a point in history where [they] finally might have fulfilled their dream of statehood, an aggressive movement…has emerged to challenge the fading Arafat and his PLO.”[44] That movement was and is Hamas and Islamic extremism.

            Groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad are continuing to gain support in the territories. Part of this is because “Hamas controls the education system in Gaza from kindergarten through high school, as well as the religious schools, mosques, and the Islamic universities in Gaza and Jerusalem.”[45] Their ideology of total domination of Israel, terrorist attacks toward Israelis, and flat-out rejection of democracy, undoubtedly permeates through these institutions. It bears repeating that “Hamas represent…popular aspirations of the Palestinian people.”[46] Again, not only are the aspirations popular (Hamas won elections in 2006), but the methods to attain those wishes are turning increasingly violent with serious ramifications to a peace deal.[47]

            Take the words of Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Abdallah Shallah, for example, as to why Islam cannot coexist with Israel. On “Greater Israel,” Shallah does not mince words, pointing out that “the Arabs and Muslims also understand that Israel is a danger to them, as the Zionist dream is not limited to Palestine and cannot be realized through anything less than an empire. It is thus that Palestine in the Zionist project is but a center and a base from which Israel can leap onto the rest of the Arab and Muslim worlds.”[48] Where is it possible for peace to fit into such an equation? If you were to ask Shallah and Hamas, the answer would be nowhere. On the topic of Oslo, Shallah sees no value “when its price was recognition of Israel and when its aim is the preservation of Israel’s security.”[49] Regardless of current Israeli policy, the prospect of peace is nonexistent when one side is committed to ignoring the existence of the other. As long as there is a sizeable portion of the Palestinian population that shares these beliefs, peace is not an option.

            The result of Hamas leadership is evident, and the results do not maintain an eye towards the prospect of peace. Let us take a look at what Hamas has done after taking control of the Gaza Strip in order to further illustrate the unlikeliness of a possible peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians. There is no place for Israel in the Islamic political and ideological entity that Hamas strives to establish, and “Hamas continues to embrace to road of violence with regard to Israel, disregarding any compromise, negotiations, or settlement with it.”[50] This presents a problem to peace because even if the Palestinian Authority (Hamas’s largest opponent in the West Bank) remained committed to peace talks, Hamas’s unwillingness to talk prevents such talks from happening. Israel demonstrated their desire to make peace with their neighbors after their peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. Moreover, they were able to do so under the leadership of two separate and distinct governments, one right-wing (Begin and Likud) and one left-wing (Rabin and Labor).

 

IV. In Conclusion

            Right-wing ideologies present barriers to peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian movement. These barriers are more easily overcome in Israeli politics. Democracy provides an opportunity for the left-wing segment of the population to gain control of government. As we have seen, the Israeli left has been far more willing to let go of territories than the right. The shadow of terrorism will continue to be a strong deciding factor in which Israeli government will be elected. The absence of Islamic terrorism would decidedly weaken the power of the Israeli right-wing and would likely propel the left back into a position of power. Until that point, to which there is no end in sight, the realistic solution for Israel is a policy of defense and retaliation. Bolstering their defense networks, including Iron Dome, and continuing to highlight the disastrous effects of Hamas leadership in Gaza should be the focus of Israeli efforts. It is much harder to kill an ideology, especially one that is rooted in religion, than vote a government out of power. For this reason and the others detailed in this paper, Islamic extremism is the single greatest barrier to an Israeli-Palestinian peace. The strong support for Hamas illustrates how far the Palestinians have drifted away from negotiating a peace with Israel, and how untenable the prospect of peace remains to this day.


 

Works Cited

 

Aryeh Shaleṿ. The Intifada: Causes and Effects. JCSS Study; No. 16. (Westview Press: Boulder, 1991).

 

Barak, Oren. "The Failure of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, 1993-2000." Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 6 (2005): 719-36. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30042415.

 

Ben-Moshe, Danny. "The Oslo Peace Process and Two Views on Judaism and Zionism, 1992-1996." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 1 (2005): 13-27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30037659.

 

Bernard Wasserstein. Israelis and Palestinians: Why Do They Fight? Can They Stop? Third ed. (Yale University Press: New Haven, 2008).

 

"EGYPT-ISRAEL: TREATY OF PEACE." International Legal Materials 18, no. 2 (1979): 362-93. http://www.jstor.org.access.library.miami.edu/stable/20692030.

 

Galia Golan. Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement. Markus Weiner Publishers: Princeton, 2007).

 

Hermann, Tamar, and Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar. "Divided Yet United: Israeli-Jewish Attitudes toward the Oslo Process." Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 (2002): 597-613. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555345.

 

Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Fourth Edition, Updated. ed. (Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, 2005).

 

“Jordan-Israel Agreement." Economic and Political Weekly 29, no. 47 (1994): 2950. http://www.jstor.org.access.library.miami.edu/stable/4402017.

 

Lustick, Ian S. "The Oslo Agreement as an Obstacle to Peace." Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 1 (1997): 61-66. doi:10.2307/2537810.

 

MOBLEY, BLAKE W. "FATAH AND BLACK SEPTEMBER." In Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection, 63-102. Columbia University Press, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/mobl15876.6.

 

Newman, David. "From Hitnachalut to Hitnatkut: The Impact of Gush Emunim and the Settlement Movement on Israeli Politics and Society." Israel Studies 10, no. 3 (2005): 192-224. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30245772.

 

Perlmutter, Amos. "The Israel-PLO Accord Is Dead." Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (1995): 59-68. doi:10.2307/20047123.

 

Perlmutter, Amos. "Unilateral Withdrawal: Israel's Security Option." Foreign Affairs 64, no. 1 (1985): 141-53. doi:10.2307/20042471.

 

Ramadan 'Abdallah Shallah, and Khalid Al-'Ayid. "The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process." Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 4 (1999): 61-73. doi:10.2307/2538393.

 

Raphael Israeli. The Oslo Idea: The Euphoria of Failure. (New Brunswik: Transaction Publishers, 2012).

 

R. B. Soetendorp. The Dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Theory, History and Cases. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2007).

 

Smooha, Sammy, and Don Peretz. "Israel's 1992 Knesset Elections: Are They Critical?" Middle East Journal 47, no. 3 (1993): 444-63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328604.

 

Sprinzak, Ehud. "The Emergence of the Israeli Radical Right." Comparative Politics 21, no. 2 (1989): 171-92. doi:10.2307/422043.

 

Tessler, Mark. "The Intifada and Political Discourse in Israel." Journal of Palestine Studies 19, no. 2 (1990): 43-61. doi:10.2307/2537412.

 

 


[1] Taylor, Alan R. "Zionism and Jewish History." Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 2 (1972): 35-51.

[2] Ian J. Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Fourth Edition, Updated. ed. (Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, 2005).

[3] Ibid

[4] "EGYPT-ISRAEL: TREATY OF PEACE." International Legal Materials 18, no. 2 (1979): 362-93. http://www.jstor.org.access.library.miami.edu/stable/20692030.

[5] Ibid

[6] “Jordan-Israel Agreement." Economic and Political Weekly 29, no. 47 (1994): 2950. http://www.jstor.org.access.library.miami.edu/stable/4402017.

[7] Ibid

[8] Perlmutter, Amos. "Unilateral Withdrawal: Israel's Security Option." Foreign Affairs 64, no. 1 (1985): 141-53. doi:10.2307/20042471.

[9] Tessler, Mark. "The Intifada and Political Discourse in Israel." Journal of Palestine Studies 19, no. 2 (1990): 43-61. doi:10.2307/2537412.

[10] MOBLEY, BLAKE W. "FATAH AND BLACK SEPTEMBER." In Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection, 63-102. Columbia University Press, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/mobl15876.6.

[11] Bickerton and Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 215.

[12] Perlmutter, "Unilateral Withdrawal: Israel's Security Option."

[13] R. B. Soetendorp. The Dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Theory, History and Cases. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2007).

[14] Aryeh Shaleṿ. The Intifada: Causes and Effects. JCSS Study; No. 16. (Westview Press: Boulder, 1991).

[15] Ibid

[16] Bickerton and Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 218.

[17] Shaleṿ. The Intifada: Causes and Effects.

[18] Bickerton and Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

[19] Bickerton and Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

[20] Bickerton and Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 218.

[21] Bickerton and Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 226.

[22] Bickerton and Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 224.

[23] Ibid

[24] Aryeh Shaleṿ. The Intifada: Causes and Effects. JCSS Study; No. 16. (Westview Press: Boulder, 1991).

[25] Smooha, Sammy, and Don Peretz. "Israel's 1992 Knesset Elections: Are They Critical?" Middle East Journal 47, no. 3 (1993): 444-63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328604.

[26] Ibid                                               

[27] Galia Golan. Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement. Markus Weiner Publishers: Princeton, 2007).

[28] Ibid

[29] Sprinzak, Ehud. "The Emergence of the Israeli Radical Right." Comparative Politics 21, no. 2 (1989): 171-92. doi:10.2307/422043.

[30] Soetendorp. The Dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Theory, History and Cases. 91.

[31] Ibid

[32] Ibid

[33] Perlmutter, "Unilateral Withdrawal: Israel's Security Option." 153.

[34] Soetendorp. The Dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Theory, History and Cases. 92.

[35] Soetendorp. The Dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Theory, History and Cases. 93.

[36] Golan. Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement.

[37] Soetendorp. The Dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Theory, History and Cases. 93.

[38] Soetendorp. The Dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Theory, History and Cases. 93.

[39] Golan. Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement.

[40] Raphael Israeli. The Oslo Idea: The Euphoria of Failure. (New Brunswik: Transaction Publishers, 2012). 100.

[41] Bernard Wasserstein. Israelis and Palestinians: Why Do They Fight? Can They Stop? Third ed. (Yale University Press: New Haven, 2008).

[42] Ben-Moshe, Danny. "The Oslo Peace Process and Two Views on Judaism and Zionism, 1992-1996." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 1 (2005): 13-27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30037659.

[43] Ibid

[44] Perlmutter, Amos. "The Israel-PLO Accord Is Dead." Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (1995): 59-68. doi:10.2307/20047123. 64.

[45] Perlmutter, "The Israel-PLO Accord Is Dead."65.

[46] Ibid

[47] Bernard Wasserstein. Israelis and Palestinians: Why Do They Fight? Can They Stop?

[48] Ramadan 'Abdallah Shallah, and Khalid Al-'Ayid. "The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process." Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 4 (1999): 61-73. doi:10.2307/2538393.

[49] Ibid

[50] Israeli. The Oslo Idea: The Euphoria of Failure. 104.